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Nontechnical Summary 
 
In applied energy policy analysis there is a commonly perceived dichotomy between bottom-up models of 
the energy system and top-down models of the overall economy. Bottom-up models provide a detailed 
description of the energy system from primary energy processing via multiple conversion, transport, and 
distribution processes to final energy use but neglect interactions with the rest of the economy. 
Furthermore, the formulation of such models as mathematical programs restricts their direct applicability 
to integrable equilibrium problems; many interesting policy problems involving initial inefficiencies can 
therefore not be handled directly. Top-down economy-wide models on the other hand are able to capture 
market interactions and inefficiencies in a comprehensive manner but typically lack technological details 
that might be relevant for the policy issue at hand. 
In this paper, we motivate the formulation of market equilibria as a mixed complementarity problem 
(MCP) in order to bridge the gap between bottom-up and top-down analysis. Through the explicit 
representation of weak inequalities and complementarity between decision variables and functional 
relationships, the MCP approach allows to exploit the advantages of each model type − technological 
details of bottom-up models and economic richness of top-down models − in a single mathematical 
format.  
We demonstrate the integration of bottom-up into top-down along a simple stylized example and present 
illustrative policy simulations with our integrated model on central energy policy issues including green 
quotas, nuclear phase-out, and carbon taxation. Together with an explicit algebraic representation, we 
provide the computer programs for the replication of simulation results. The latter may serve as a starting 
point for further − more elaborate − applications by the interested reader.  
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Abstract
We motivate the formulation of market equilibria as a mixed complementarity problem
(MCP) in order to bridge the gap between bottom-up energy system models and top-down
general equilibrium models for energy policy analysis. Our objective is primarily pedagogic.
We first lay out that the MCP approach provides an explicit representation of weak inequal-
ities and complementarity between decision variables and market equilibrium conditions.
This permits us to combine bottom-up technological details and top-down economic richness
in a single mathematical format. We then provide a stylized example of how to integrate
bottom-up features into a top-down modeling framework along with worked examples and
computer programs which illustrate our approach.
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1 Introduction
There are two wide-spread modeling approaches for the quantitative assessment of economic
impacts induced by energy policies: bottom-up energy system models and top-down models
of the broader economy. The two model classes differ mainly with respect to the empha-
sis placed on technological details of the energy system vis-a`-vis the comprehensiveness of
endogenous market adjustments.
Bottom-up energy system models are partial equilibrium representations of the energy
sector. They feature a larger number of discrete energy technologies to capture substitution of
energy carriers on the primary and final energy level, process substitution, process (efficiency)
improvements, or energy savings but omit interaction with the rest of the economy. These
models are typically cast as optimization problems that compute the least-cost combination
of energy system activities to meet a given demand for final energy or energy services subject
to technical restrictions and energy policy constraints.
Top-down models adopt a broader economic framework taking into account interaction
and spillover effects between markets as well as income effects for various economic agents
such as private households or the government. The high degree of endogeneity in economic
responses to policy shocks typically goes at the expense of specific sectoral or technological
detail. As a matter of fact, conventional top-down models of energy-economy interactions
have a very skimpy representation of the energy system: Energy transformation processes
are represented by smooth production functions which capture abstract substitution (trans-
formation) possibilities through constant elasticities of substitution (transformation). Con-
sequently, top-down models usually lack detail on current and future technological options
which may be relevant for an appropriate assessment of specific energy policy proposals.1
The specific strengths and weaknesses of the bottom-up and top-down framework explain
continuous hybrid modeling efforts that combine technological explicitness of bottom-up
models with the economic richness of top-down models. There are three major approaches
to hybridizing: First, existing – independently developed – bottom-up and top-down models
can be linked. This approach has been adopted since the early 1970ies (see e.g. Hofman and
Jorgenson [1976], Hogan and Weyant [1982], or Messner and Strubegger [1987]) but often
challenges overall coherence due to inconsistencies in behavioral assumptions and account-
ing concepts of ”soft-linked” models. Second, one could focus on one model type – either
bottom-up or top-down – and use ”reduced form” representations of the other. A prominent
example along this line is ETA-Macro (Manne [1977]) which links a detailed bottom-up en-
ergy system model with a highly aggregate one-sector macro-economic model of production
and consumption within a single optimization framework.2 The third approach provides
1In addition, top-down models may not assure fundamental physical restrictions such as the conservation of
matter and energy.
2More recent hybrid modelling approaches based on the same technique include Bahn et al. [1999] or Messner
and Schrattenholzer [2000].
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completely integrated models (see e.g. Bo¨hringer [1998]) based on developments of solu-
tion algorithms for mixed complementarity problems during the mid90ies (Dirkse and Ferris
[1995], Rutherford [1995]).
In this paper, we focus on the integrated mixed complementarity approach which stands
out for the coherence and logical appeal to bridging the gap between conventional bottom-up
energy system models and top-down computable general equilibrium (CGE) models for en-
ergy policy analysis.3 Apart from accommodating discrete activity analysis with respect to
alternative technological options in an economy-wide framework, the mixed complementarity
approach relaxes so-called ”integrability” conditions that are inherent to bottom-up models
or integrated system models formulated as optimization problem. In applied energy policy
analysis it is often overlooked that optimization problems are only equivalent to economic
market equilibrium problems subject to integrability conditions that imply efficient allocation
(Pressman [1970] or Takayma and Judge [1971]). Since many interesting economic problems
are associated with non-integrable second-best situations (due to ad-valorem taxes, institu-
tional price constraints, or spillover externalities), the optimization approach to integrate
bottom-up and top-down is relatively limited in the scope of policy applications.4
Our objective is primarily pedagogic. We start by motivating the formulation of market
equilibria as a mixed complementarity problem (MCP). The MCP formulation explicitly
features weak inequalities and complementarity between decision variables and market equi-
librium conditions: This permits the modeler to combine the advantages of bottom-up tech-
nological details and top-down economic richness in a single mathematical format. We then
lay out the integration of a stylized bottom-up representation for electricity generation into
a simple top-down description of the wider economy. Finally, we present illustrative policy
simulations with our integrated model on central energy policy issues including green quotas,
nuclear phase-out, or carbon taxation. Along with an algebraic representation, we provide
the computer programs for the replication of simulation results. The latter may serve as a
potential starting point for further more elaborate applied analysis by the interested reader.
3Apart from CGE models that adopt the (neoclassical) microeconomic rationale, top-down approaches may
also include aggregate demand-driven Keynesian models which typically put more emphasis on macroeconomic
phenomena and econometric foundations (see Weyant and Olavson [1999]).
4”Non-integrabilities” furthermore reflect empirical evidence that individual demand functions depend not only
on prices but also on the initial endowments. In such cases, demand functions are typically not ”integrable” into
an economy-wide utility function (see e.g. Chipman [1974]): Only if the matrix of cross-price elasticities (i.e. the
first-order partial derivatives of the demand functions) be symmetric, is there an associated optimization problem
which can be used to compute the equilibrium prices and quantities.
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2 Mixed Complementarity Formulation of Market Equi-
libria
We consider a competitive (Arrow-Debreu) economy with n commodities (incl. factors), m
production activities (sectors), and h households. The decision variables of the economy can
be classified into three categories (Mathiesen [1985]):
p is a non-negative n-vector (with running index i) in prices for all goods and factors
y denotes a non-negative m-vector (with running index j) for activity levels of constant-
returns-to-scale (CRTS) production sectors, and
M represents a non-negative k-vector (with running index h)in incomes.
A competitive market equilibrium is characterized by a non-negative vector of activity
levels (y ≥ 0), a non-negative vector of prices (p ≥ 0 ), and a non-negative vector of incomes
(M ≥ 0) such that:
• No production activity makes a positive profit (zero-profit condition), i.e.:
−Πj(p) = −a
T
j (p)p ≥ 0 (1)
where:
Πj(p) denotes the unit profit function for CRTS production activity j, which is calcu-
lated as the difference between unit revenue and unit cost, and
aTj (p) is the price-dependent technology vector for activity j which by – Hotelling’s
Lemma – corresponds to the the partial derivate ∇Πj(p).
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• Excess supply (supply minus demand) is non-negative for all goods and factors (market
clearance condition), i.e.:
∑
j
yj∇Πj(p) +
∑
h
wh ≥
∑
h
dh(p,Mh) (2)
where:
wh indicates the initial endowment vector of household h, and
dh(p,Mh) is the utility maximizing demand vector for household h.
• Expenditure for household each h does not exceed income (budget constraint), i.e.:
Mh = p
Twh (3)
Using Walras’ law, we can transform equilibrium conditions (1)-(3) to yield:
yiΠj(p) = 0 (4)
5Input coefficients have a negative sign; output coefficients are positive.
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pi[
∑
j
(yi∇Πj(p) +
∑
h
wh)−
∑
h
dh(p,Mh)] = 0 (5)
Mh(Mh − p
Twh) = 0 (6)
Thus, economic equilibrium features complementarity between equilibrium variables and
equilibrium conditions: (i) positive market prices imply market clearance, otherwise com-
modities are in excess supply and the respective prices fall to zero; (ii) activities will be
operated as long as they break even, otherwise production activities are shut down; and (iii)
income variables are linked to income budget constraints.
The complementarity features of economic equilibrium motivate the formulation of mar-
ket equilibrium problems as a mixed complementarity problem (Rutherford [1995]):6
Given f: RN → RN , l, u ∈ RN
Find z, w, v ∈ RN
subject to
F (z)− w + v = 0
l ≤ z ≤ u, w ≥ 0, v ≥ 0,
wT (z − l) = 0, vT (u− z) = 0
We obtain the formulation of our market equilibrium as a mixed complementarity problem
(MCP) by setting l = 0, u = +∞, z = [y, p,M ], and letting F(z) depict the equilibrium
conditions (1)-(3). The MCP formulation provides a flexible framework for the integration
of bottom-up activity analysis where alternative technologies t can produce the same output
subject to technology-specific capacity constraints. As a concrete example, we may consider
the standard linear planning problem to find a least-cost supply schedule for meeting an
exogenous demand in energy good (sevice) j:
min
∑
i
∑
t
piaijtyjt (7)
subject to
∑
t
yjt +
∑
i6=j
ajiy¯i +
∑
h
wjh ≥
∑
h
d¯jh
yjt ≤
∑
h
whjt
where:
6The term ”mixed complementarity problem” (MCP) reflects central features of this mathematical format:
”mixed” indicates that the MCP formulation includes equalities as well as inequalities; ”complementarity” refers
to complementary slackness between system variables and system conditions.
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yjt is the activity level of technology t producing energy good j,
aijt denotes the (fixed) input coefficient for good i of technology t producing energy good j,
d¯jh represents the exogenous demand by household h for energy good j,
y¯i is the exogenous level of non-energy production activity i, and
whjt is the capacity of technology t producing energy good j which is owned by household
h.
When we derive the Kuhn-Tucker conditions of the linear program, we obtain:
−(
∑
i
aijtpi + λjt)− pij ≥ 0, yjt, yjt[−(
∑
i
aijtpi + λjt)− pij ] = 0 (8)
∑
t
yjt+
∑
i
ajiy¯i+
∑
h
wjh ≥
∑
h
d¯jh, pij , pij(
∑
t
yjt+
∑
i
ajiy¯i+
∑
h
wjh−
∑
h
d¯jh) = 0 (9)
yjt ≤
∑
h
whjt, λjt, λjt(
∑
h
whjt − yjt) = 0 (10)
where:
pij is the shadow price on the supply-demand balance for energy good j, and
λjt is the shadow price on the capacity constraint for technology t producing energy good
j.
Comparing the Kuhn-Tucker conditions with the MCP formulation of our market equi-
librium problem, we see that both are equivalent as the shadow prices of programming
constraints coincide with market prices. The linear mathematical program can be readily
interpreted as a special case of the general equilibrium problem where (i) income constraints
are dropped, (ii) energy market demand of the non-energy system is exogenous, and (iii) en-
ergy supply technologies are characterized by fixed coefficients (rather than price-responsive
coefficients). In turn, we can replace an aggregate top-down description of energy good pro-
duction in the general equilibrium market setting with the Kuhn-Tucker conditions of the
linear program which provides technological details.
Beyond the direct integration of bottom-up activity analysis, we can extend the MCP
formulation of market equilibrium by adding explicit bounds on decisions variables such as
prices or activity levels. Examples for price constraints may include lower bounds on the real
wage or prescribed price caps on energy goods (upper bounds). As to quantity constraints,
examples may include administered bounds on the share of specific energy sources (e.g.
renewables or nuclear power) or target levels for the provision of public goods. Associated
with these constraints, are complementary variables: In the case of price constraints, a
rationing variable applies as soon as the price constraint becomes binding; in the case of
quantity constraints, a complementary endogenous subsidy or tax is introduced.
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3 Integration of Bottom-up into Top-Down: A Simple
Maquette
In order to illustrate the MCP integration of bottom-up technological details into a top-down
general equilibrium framework, we consider a stylized static closed economy.
On the production side, firms minimize costs of producing output subject to nested
constant-elasticity-of-substitution (CES) functions that describe the price-dependent use of
factors and intermediate input. In the production of some macro good ROI, capital and elec-
tricity inputs trade off in the lower nest. The capital-electricity composite is then combined
at the top-level with labor. The unit-profit function of macro-good production (i ∈ ROI)
reads as:
ΠYi =pi − {(θL,ipL)
1−σ + (1− θL,i)[θELE,ip
1−σELE,i
ELE
+ (1− θELE,i)p
1−σELE,i
K ]
1−σ
1−σELE,i }
1
1−σ
(11)
where:
pi is the price of good i,
pL refers to the price of labor,
pELE denotes the electricity price,
pK represents the price of capital,
θL,i is the cost share of labor in production of good i,
θELE,i represents the cost share of electricity in the sector-specific capital-electricity com-
posite,
σ is the elasticity of substitution between labor and non-labor inputs, and
σELE,i is the elasticity of substitution between electricity and capital.
In the production of fossil fuels – here: coal, gas, and oil – all inputs, except for the
sector-specific fossil-fuel resource, are aggregated in fixed proportions at the lower nest. At
the top level this aggregate trades off with the sector-specific fossil fuel resource at a constant
elasticity of substitution.7 The unit-profit function for fossil fuel production (i ∈ FF ) is:
ΠYi = pi − {θip
1−σi
Q,i + (1− θi)[θROI,ipROI + (1− θROI,i)pL]
1−σi}
1
1−σi (12)
where:
pQ,i represents the price of the fossil fuel ressource (i ∈ FF ),
pROI is the price of the ROI macro good,
7The latter can then be calibrated in consistency with empirical estimates for price elasticities of fossil fuel
supply.
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θi denotes the cost share of the fossil fuel resource,
θROI,i refers the cost share of the ROI macro good in the aggregate input of ROI and labor,
and
σi is the elasticity of substitution between the fossil fuel ressource and the ROI-labor com-
posite.
In our stylized example, we illustrate the integration of bottom-up activity analysis into
the generic top-down representation of the overall economy along the example of the elec-
tricty sector. Rather than describing electricity generation by means of a single continuous
smooth CES production function we capture production possibilities by discrete (Leontief-
fix) technologies that are active or inactive in equilibrium depending on their profitability.
The detailed technological representation may be necessary for an appropriate assessment
of specific policy proposals. For example, energy policies may prescribe target shares of
specific technologies in overall electricity production (such as green quotas) or the gradual
elimination of certain power generation technologies (such as a nuclear phase-out). We can
write the unit-profit functions of discrete power generation technologies as:
ΠELEt = pELE − θROI,tpROI − θK,tpK −
∑
i∈FF
θi,tpi − pU,t (13)
where:
pU,t is the shadow price (rental rate) on the upper capacity bound for technology t,
θROI,t denotes the cost share of ROI in electricity production by technology t,
θK,t refers to the cost share of capital in electricity production by technology t, and
θi,t represents the cost share of fossil fuel i (i ∈ FF ) in electricity production by technology
t.
Finally, a composite consumption good is produced subject to a two-level CES technology
where electricity and oil trade off at the second level and the electricity-oil composite is then
combined with the macro good at the top level. The unit-profit function for the production
of the final consumption good is:
ΠC =pC − {θROI,Cp
1−σC
ROI + (1− θROI,C)[θELE,Cp
1−σELE,C
ELE
+ (1− θELE,C)p
1−σELE,C
OIL ]
1−σC
1−σELE,C }
1
1−σC
(14)
where:
pC is the price of the final consumption composite,
pOIL denotes the price of oil,
θROI,C represents the cost share of ROI in the final consumption aggregate,
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θELE,C refers to the cost share of electricity in the oil-electricity composite of final consump-
tion,
σC is the elasticity of substitution between energy and non-energy inputs in final consump-
tion, and
σELE,C denotes the elasticity of substitution between electricity and oil within the oil-
electricity composite of final consumption.
In our stylized economy, a representative household is endowed with primary factors
labor, capital, and fossil fuel resources (used for fossil fuel production). Total income of the
household consists of factor payments:
M = pLL¯+ pKK¯ +
∑
i∈FF
pQ,iQ¯i +
∑
t
U¯tpU,t (15)
where:
M is the income of the representative household,
L¯ denotes the aggregate labor endowment,
K¯ represents the aggregate capital endowment,
Q¯i refers to the ressource endowment with fossil fuel (i ∈ FF ), and
U¯t denotes the available capacity for technology t.
The representative household maximizes utility from consumption subject to available
income.
Flexible prices on competitive markets for factors and goods assure balance of supply and
demand 8 Using Hotelling’s lemma, we can derive compensated supply and demand functions
of goods and factors on the producer side. Composite consumption of the representative
household is given by Roy’s identity.
Market clearance conditions for our stylized economy then read as:
• Labor market clearance:
L¯ ≥
∑
i
∂ΠYi
∂pL
Yi +
∑
t
∂ΠELEt
∂pL
Xt +
∂ΠC
∂pL
C (16)
where:
Yi denotes the level of production of good i (except for electricity),
C is the level of aggregate final consumption, and
Xt represents the level of electricity production by technology t.
8Price rigidities such as fixed wages could be easily accommodated through the specification of explicit price
constraints together with associated rationing conditions for the respective markets.
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• Capital market clearance:
K¯ ≥
∑
i
∂ΠYi
∂pK
Yi +
∑
t
∂ΠELEt
∂pK
Xt (17)
• Market clearance for fossil fuel ressources (i ∈ FF ):
Q¯i ≥
∂ΠY
∂pQ,i
Yi (18)
• Market clearence for capacity bounds:
U¯t ≥
∂ΠELEt
∂pU,t
Xt (19)
• Market clearance for production goods (except for electricity):
Yi ≥
∑
j
∂ΠYj
∂pi
Yj +
∑
t
∂ΠELEt
∂pi
Xt +
∂ΠC
∂pi
C (20)
• Market clearance for electricity:
∑
t
Xt ≥
∑
i
∂ΠYi
∂pELE
Yi +
∂ΠC
∂pELE
C (21)
• Market clearance for the final consumption composite:
C ≥
M
pC
(22)
Figure 1 provides a diagrammatic structure of our stylized economy using the notations
of our algebraic exposition (for the sake of transparency, we do no consider the bottom-up
representation of electricity generation here).
As to the parameterization of our simple numerical model, benchmark prices and quan-
tities, together with exogenous elasticities, determine the free parameters of the functional
forms that describe technologies and preferences. Table 1 describes our benchmark equilib-
rium in terms of a social accounting matrix (King [1985]).
Table 1: Base Year Equilibrium
ROI COA GAS OIL ELE RA Key
ROI 200 -5 -5 -10 -180 ROI: rest of industry
COA 15 -15 COA: coal
GAS 15 -15 GAS: gas
OIL 30 -30 OIL: oil
ELE -10 60 -50 ELE: electricity
Capital -80 -20 100 RA: household
Labor -110 -5 -5 -10 130
Rent -5 -5 -10 20
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Figure 1: Diagrammatic Structure of Stylized Economy
In general, data consistency of a social accounting matrix requires that the sums of entries
across each of the rows and columns equal zero: Market equilibrium conditions are associated
with the rows, the columns capture the zero-profit condition for production sectors as well
as the income balance for the aggregate household sector. Benchmark data are typically
delivered in value terms, i.e. they are products of prices and quantities. In order to obtain
separate price and quantity observations, the common procedure is to choose units for goods
and factors so that they have a price of unity (net of potential taxes or subsidies) in the
benchmark equilibrium. Then, the value terms simply correspond to the physical quantities.
Table 2 provides a bottom-up description of initially active power technologies (here: gas-
fired power plants, coal-fired power plants, nuclear power plants, and hydro power plants) for
the base year. Note that the benchmark outputs of active technologies sum up to economy-
wide electricity demand while input requirements add up to aggregate demands as reported
in the social accounting matrix.9 Table 3 includes bottom-up technology coefficients (cost
data) for initially inactive technologies (here: wind, solar, and biomass). In our example,
unit-output of inactive technologies is listed as 10% more costly than the electricity price in
the base year.10
9In our exposition, we impose consistency of aggregate top-down data with bottom-up technology data. In
modelling practise, the harmonization of bottom-up data with top-down data may require substantial data ad-
justments to create a consistent database for the hybrid model.
10The cost gap for inactive technologies is an input that can be easily adjusted according to user assumptions
within our numerical model implementation (see Appendix).
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Table 2: Cost Structure of Active Table 3: Cost Structure of Inactive
Technologies (Base Year) Technologies (Base Year)
coal gas nuclear hydro wind solar biomass
ELE 20 20 12 8 ELE 1 1 1
ROI -1 -1 -8 ROI -0.2 -0.3 -0.4
GAS -15 Capital -0.9 -0.8 -0.7
COA -15 wind -1
Capital -4 -4 -4 -8 sun -1
trees -1
We can formulate the integrated top-down and bottom-up model as a system of weak
inequalities and complementarity conditions based on the MCP approach. Appendix A
provides a compact summary of the algebraic equilibrium conditions for our stylized hybrid
model. The model is implemented in GAMS (Brooke et al. [1996]) using PATH (Dirkse and
Ferris [1995]) as a solver. The programming files are attached in Appendix B – formulated
either as an explicit MCP based on plain algebra or as an implicit MCP based on the meta-
language MPSGE (Rutherford [1999a]).
4 Policy Simulations
In this section, we illustrate the use of our stylized hybrid bottom-up/top-down model for
the economic assessment of three energy policy initiatives that figure prominently at the EU
level: (i) nuclear phase-out, (ii) target quotas for renewables in electricity production (green
quotas), and (iii) carbon taxation.
A central issue surrounding the controversial policy debate of these initiatives is the
induced economic adjustment effects. Model-based simulation results of these effects may
not only differ in the order of magnitude but even in the sign depending on the underlying
parameterization and behavioral assumption. A concrete bottom-up representation of tech-
nological options may improve the ”credibility” of model results. Furthermore, the MCP
formulation of the hybrid bottom-up/top-down model permits representation of potentially
important second-best effects that are typically omitted from market equilibrium models
phrased as optimization problems.
In order to test the robustness of model results, sensitivity analysis with respect to uncer-
tainties in the model’s parameterization space is inevitable. A deliberate sensitivity analysis
helps to identify robust insights on the complex relationships between assumptions (inputs)
and results (outputs), i.e., to sort out the relative importance of a priori uncertainties. In
this vein, our stylized model framework allows for user-defined changes of key model pa-
rameters.11 Our results section below is restrained to the central case parameterization
11The interested reader can use the GAMS program in the Appendix to perform sensitivity analysis.
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and reports on selected economic dimensions such as welfare impacts (measured as Hicksian
equivalent variation in income) or the composition of energy supply by technologies.
4.1 Nuclear Phase-Out
Reservations against the use of nuclear power are reflected in policy initiatives of several
EU Member States (Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands, Spain, and Sweden) that foresee
a gradual phase-out of their nuclear power programs (OECD/IEA [2001]). In our stylized
hybrid model, policy constraints on the use of nuclear power can be easily implemented via
parametric changes of upper bounds (here: U¯nuclear).
Figure 2 reports the welfare changes (vis-a`-vis the benchmark level) as a function of the
continuous reduction in nuclear power use. We report adjustment costs for two alternative
assumptions on the relevant time horizon which are accomodated as a simple user-defined
parametric switch in our model program: In the short-run analysis – labeled as “ short”
– we assume that capital embodied in extant technologies is not malleable, whereas the
long-run analysis – labeled as “ long” – presumes fully malleable (mobile) capital across all
sectors and technologies. Obviously, adjustment costs to binding technological constraints
are substantially higher in the short-run with restricted capital malleability (“stranded in-
vestment”).
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Figure 2: Welfare Changes for Nuclear Phase-Out
Figure 3 illustrates the changes in the supply of electricity across the different technologies
in the long-run. For our illustrative cost parameterization of technologies, the administered
decrease in nuclear power generation will be replaced by an increase in gas- and coal-based
power generation whereas renewable technologies remain slack acitivites (apart from hydro
12
which is already operated at the upper bound in the reference situation).
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Figure 3: Technology Shifts in Power Production for Nuclear Phase-Out
4.2 Renewables Targets (Green Quotas)
Renewable energy technologies have received political support within the EU since the early
1970ies. After the oil crises renewable energy was primarily seen as a long-term substitu-
tion to fossil fuels in order to increase EU-wide security of supply. In the light of climate
change, the motive has shifted to environmental concerns: Renewables are considered as
an important alternative to thermal produced electricity that emits greenhouse gases. In
2001, the EU Commission issued a Directive which aims at doubling the share of renewable
energy in EU-wide gross energy consumption 2010 as compared to 1997 levels (European
Commission (EC) [2001]). In our stylized framework, we can implement the prescription
of green quotas by setting a cumulative quantity constraint on the share of electricity that
comes from renewable energy sources. This quantity constraint is associated with a comple-
mentary endogenous subsidy on renewable electricity production (paid by the representative
household). The required changes to the algebraic model formulation include (i) the ex-
plicit quantity constraint on the target quota, (ii) endogenous subsidies on green electricity
production, and (iii) the adjustment of the income constraint to account for overall subsidy
payments (see Appendix). In our base year, the share of electricity produced by renewable
energy sources (here: hydro) amounts to roughly 13%. In the counterfactual, we gradually
increase this share to 33%. Figures 4 and 5 report the short-run and long-run implications
for economic welfare and required subsidy rates.
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Figure 4: Welfare Changes under Green Quotas
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Figure 5: Subsidy Rate for Green Quotas
4.3 Carbon Taxation (Environmental Tax Reform)
Over the last decade, several EU Member States have levied some type of carbon tax in order
to reduce greenhouse gas emissions from fossil fuel combustion that contribute to anthro-
pogenic global warming (OECD [2001]). In this context, the debate on the double dividend
14
hypothesis has addressed the question of whether the usual trade-off between environmental
benefits and gross economic costs12 of emission taxes prevails in economies where distor-
tionary taxes finance public spending. Emission taxes raise public revenues which can be
used to reduce existing tax distortions. Revenue recycling may then provide prospects for a
double from emission taxation (Goulder [1995]): Apart form an improvement in environmen-
tal quality (the first dividend), the overall excess burden of the tax system may be reduced
by using additional tax revenues for a revenue-neutral cut of existing distortionary taxes (the
second dividend).13
Since our stylized hybrid model in MCP format is not limited by integrability constraints,
we can use it to investigate the rationale behind the double dividend discussion. As a first
step, we must refine Table 1 which so far only reports base year economic flows on a gross
of tax basis in order to reflect some public finance information on initial taxes and public
consumption. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that public demand amounts to some
fixed share of base year ROI final consumption. The public consumption is financed by
a distortionary consumption tax on ROI. In our policy simulations, we investigate the
economic effects of carbon taxes that are set sufficiently high to reduce carbon emissions
by 5%, 10%, 15%, and 20% compared to the base year emission level. While keeping the
level of public good consumption at the base-year level, the additional carbon tax revenues
can be either recycled lump-sum to the representative household or can be used to cut back
distortionary capital taxes.
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Figure 6: Welfare Changes for Alternative Environmental Tax Reforms
12That is the costs disregarding environmental benefits.
13If – at the margin – the excess burden of the environmental tax is smaller than that of the replaced (decreased)
existing tax, public financing becomes more efficient and welfare gains will occur.
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Figure 6 depicts the welfare implications of our environmental tax reforms. The first
insight – in line with the undisputed weak-double dividend hypothesis (see Goulder 1995) –
is that the reduction of the distortionary consumption tax is superior in efficiency terms as
compared to a pure lump-sum recycling of carbon tax revenues. For modest environmental
targets, we might even obtain a strong double-dividend from revenue-neutral cuts in the
distortonary consumption tax. The second insight is less obvious and involves a bit more
tricky second-best analysis: Even lump-sum recycling of carbon taxes may provide a strong
double dividend when carbon reduction targets are set sufficiently low. The reasoning behind
is that the initial consumption tax is only partially levied on non-energy consumption which
distorts consumer choices in favor of energy (here: electricity) consumption. The imposition
of carbon taxes counteracts to some level the initial distortions by the partial consumption
tax as they lead to a relative price increase of primarily fossil-fuel based electricity.
5 Conclusions
There is a commonly perceived dichotomy between top-down CGE models and bottom-up
energy system models dealing with energy issues. Bottom-up models provide a detailed
description of the energy system from primary energy processing via multiple conversion,
transport, and distribution processes to final energy use but neglect interactions with the
rest of the economy. Furthermore, the formulation of such models as mathematical programs
restricts their direct applicability to integrable equilibrium problems; many interesting policy
problems involving initial inefficiencies can therefore not be handled – except for reverting to
rather non-transparent sequential joint maximization techniques (Rutherford [1999b]). CGE
models on the other hand are able to capture market interactions and inefficiencies in a
comprehensive manner but typically lack technological details that might be relevant for the
policy issue at hand.
In this paper, we have motivated the MCP approach to bridge the gap between bottom-
up and top-down analysis. Through the explicit representation of weak inequalities and
complementarity between decision variables and functional relationships, the MCP approach
allows to exploit the advantages of each model type – technological details of bottom-up
models and economic richness of top-down models – in a single mathematical format.
Despite the coherence and logical appeal of the integrated MCP approach, dimensionality
may impose limitations on its practical application. Bottom-up programming models of the
energy system often involve a large number of bounds on decision variables. These bounds
are treated implicitly in the mathematical programming approach but introduce unavoidable
complexity in the integrated complementarity formulation as they must be associated with
explicit price variables in order to account for income effects. Therefore, future research may
be dedicated to decomposition approaches that permit consistent combination of complex
top-down models and large-scale bottom-up energy system models for energy policy analysis.
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Appendix A: Algebraic Model Formulation
We can formulate the integrated top-down and bottom-up model as a system of weak in-
equalities and complementarity conditions based on the MCP approach. Table A1 provides
the algebraic equilibrium conditions for our stylized hybrid model. The notations for vari-
ables and parameters employed within the algebraic exposition are explained in Tables A2
and A3.14
Table A1: Equilibrium Conditions
Zero profit conditions
• Macro Production (i ∈ ROI):
ΠYi = pi − {(θL,ipL)
1−σ + (1− θL,i)[θELE,ip
1−σELE,i
ELE
+(1− θELE,i)p
1−σELE,i
K ]
1−σ
1−σELE,i }
1
1−σ
⊥ Yi
• Fossil Fuel Production (i ∈ FF ):
ΠYi = pi − {θip
1−σi
i + (1− θi)[θROI,ipROI + (1− θROI,i)pL]
1−σi}
1
1−σi ⊥ Yi
• Final Consumption:
ΠC = pC − {θROI,Cp
1−σC
ROI + (1− θROI,C)[θELE,Cp
1−σELE,C
ELE
+(1− θELE,C)p
1−σELE,C
OIL ]
1−σC
1−σELE,C }
1
1−σC
⊥ C
• Electricity production by technology (t):
ΠELEt = pELE − θROI,tpROI − θK,tpK −
∑
(i∈FF )
θFF,tpFF − pU,t ⊥ Xt
Market clearence conditions
• Labor:
L¯ ≥
∑
i
∂ΠYi
∂pL
Yi +
∑
t
∂ΠELEt
∂pL
Xt ⊥ pL
• Capital:
K¯ ≥
∑
i
∂ΠYi
∂pK
Yi +
∑
t
∂ΠELEt
∂pK
Xt ⊥ pK
• Fossil fuel ressources (i ∈ FF ):
Q¯i ≥
∂ΠY
∂pQ,i
Yi ⊥ PQ,i
• Capacity constraints (i ∈ FF ):
U¯t ≥
∂ΠELEt
∂pU,t
Xt ⊥ pU,t
• Production goods except for electricity:
14We use the ”⊥” operator to indicate complementarity between equilibrium conditions and the respective
decision variables.
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Yi ≥
∑
j
∂ΠYj
∂pi
Yj +
∑
t
∂ΠELEt
∂pi
Xt +
∂ΠC
∂pi
C ⊥ pi
• Electricity:
∑
t
Xt ≥
∑
i
∂ΠYi
∂pELE
Yi +
∂ΠC
∂pELE
C ⊥ pELE
• Final consumption composite:
C ≥ M
pC
⊥ pC
Income balance
M = pLL¯+ pKK¯ +
∑
i∈FF
pQ,iQ¯i +
∑
t
U¯tpU,t ⊥M
Table A2: Variables
Activity variables
Yi Production of good i (except for electricity)
C Aggregate final consumption
Xt Production of electricity by technology t
Price variables
pi Price of good i
pL Wage rate
pK Price of capital
pU,t Shadow price on capacity upper bound for technology t
pQ,i Scarcity price of fossil fuel ressources (i ∈ FF )
pC Price of the final consumption composite
Income variables
M Income of representative household
20
Table A3: Cost Shares, Elasticities, and Endowments
Cost shares
θL,i Cost share of labor in production of good i (except for electricitiy)
θELE,i Cost share of electricity in sector-specific capital-electricity composite (i ∈ ROI)
θi Cost share of fossil fuel ressource in fossil fuel production (i ∈ FF )
θROI,i Cost share of ROI in ROI-labor composite of fossil fuel production (i ∈ FF )
θROI,C Cost share of ROI in final consumption
θELE,C Cost share of electricity in oil-electricity composite of final consumption
θROI,t Cost share of ROI in electricity production by technology t
θK,t Cost share of capital in electricity production by technology t
θFF,t Cost share of fossil fuel FF in electricity production by technology t
Elasticities of substitution
σ Elasticity of substitution between labor and non-labor inputs in production of
good i (i ∈ ROI)
σELE,i Elasticity of substitution between electricity and capital in production of good i
(i ∈ ROI)
σi Elasticity of substitution between ressource input and non-ressource inputs in
production of fossil fuels (i ∈ FF )
σC Elasticity of substitution between energy and non-energy inputs in final consump-
tion
σELE,C Elasticity of substitution between electricity and oil in final consumption
Endowments
L¯ Aggregate labor endowment
K¯ Aggregate capital endowment
Q¯FF Ressource endowment with fossil fuel FF
U¯t Capacity of technology t
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Appendix B: GAMS Programs
5.1 MCP Formulation
1 $Title Static maquette of integrated TD/BU hybrid model
2
3 * Model formulation in MCP
4
5 *===========================================================================
6 * Model code for stylzed integrated bottom-up/top-down analysis of energy
7 * policies based on:
8 *
9 * ZEW Discussion Paper 05-28
10 * Integrating Bottom-Up into Top-Down:
11 * A Mixed Complementarity Approach
12 *
13 * Contact the authors at: boehringer@zew.de; rutherford@colorado.edu
14 *============================================================================
15
16 * For plotting the results you must have installed the gnuplot-shareware
17 * (see http://debreu.colorado.edu/gnuplot/gnuplot.htm for downloads)
18
19 *============================================================================
20 * List of parameters subject to sensitivity analysis
21 * The user can change the default settings.
22
23 * Choice of key elasticities:
24 * Elasticity of substitution in final consumption
25 $if not setglobal esub_c $setglobal esub_c 0.5
26
27 * Elasticity in gas supply
28 $if not setglobal esub_gas $setglobal esub_gas 1.5
29
30 * Elasticity in coal supply
31 $if not setglobal esub_coal $setglobal esub_coal 3
32
33 * Elasticity in oil supply
34 $if not setglobal esub_oil $setglobal esub_oil 1.5
35
36
37 * Choice of resource availability for renewables:
38 * (as a fraction of base-year total electricity production)
39 * Potential wind supply - (%)
22
40 $if not setglobal p_wind $setglobal p_wind 10
41
42 * Potential solar supply - (%)
43 $if not setglobal p_sun $setglobal p_sun 10
44
45 * Potential biomass supply - (%)
46 $if not setglobal p_trees $setglobal p_trees 10
47
48
49 * Cost disadvantage of inital slack technologies:
50 * Wind energy premium (%)
51 $if not setglobal c_wind $setglobal c_wind 10
52
53 * Solar energy premium (%)
54 $if not setglobal c_solar $setglobal c_solar 10
55
56 * Biomass energy premium (%)
57 $if not setglobal c_biomass $setglobal c_biomass 10
58
59
60 * Other central model assumptions:
61 * Time horizon (short, long)
62 * N.B.: For short-run analysis capital is immobile across sectors
63 $if not setglobal horizon $setglobal horizon long
64
65 *============================================================================
66
67
68 * Assign user-specific changes of default assumptions
69 scalar shortrun Flag for short-run capital mobility/1/;
70
71 $if "%horizon%"=="long" shortrun=0;
72
73 * Elasticitities of substitution (ESUB)
74 scalar esub_c Elasticity of substituion in final demand /%esub_c%/
75 esub_ele ESUB between electricity and oil in final demand /0.5/
76 esub_k_e ESUB between capital and energy in ROI production /0.5/
77 esub_l_ke ESUB between labor and other inputs in ROI production /0.8/;
78
79 set t Electricity Technologies (current and future)
80 /coal,gas,nuclear,hydro,wind,solar,biomass/;
81
82 set xt(t) Existing technologies /coal,gas,nuclear,hydro/;
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83
84 set nt(t) New vintage technologies /wind,solar,biomass/;
85
86 set ff Fossil fuel inputs /coa, gas, oil/;
87
88 set n Natural resources /wind, sun, trees/;
89
90
91 set res(t) Renewable energy sources /hydro, wind, solar, biomass/;
92
93 * The following data table describes an economic equilibrium in
94 * the base year:
95
96
97 table sam Base year social accounting matrix
98
99 roi coa gas oil ele ra
100 roi 200 -5 -5 -10 -10 -170
101 coa 15 -15
102 gas 15 -15
103 oil 30 -30
104 ele -10 60 -50
105 capital -80 -20 100
106 labor -110 -5 -5 -10 130
107 rent -5 -5 -10 20 ;
108
109 parameter carbon(ff) Carbon coefficients /oil 1, gas 1, coa 2/;
110
111 scalar carblim Carbon target /0/;
112
113 parameter esub_ff(ff) Elastictity of substitution in fossil fuel production
114 /gas %esub_gas%, coa %esub_coal%, oil %esub_oil%/;
115
116 * The following data tables describes electricy generation in
117 * the base year as well as the technology coefficients for technologies
118 * which are inactive in the base year (wind, solar, biomass). Inactive
119 * technologies are by defaults %c_****% more costly.
120
121 table xtelec Electricty technologies - extant (initially active)
122
123 coal gas nuclear hydro
124 ele 20 20 12 8
125 roi -1 -1 -8
24
126 gas -15
127 coa -15
128 capital -4 -4 -4 -8;
129
130
131 table ntelec Electricty technologies - new vintage (initially inactive)
132
133 wind solar biomass
134 ele 1.0 1.0 1.0
135 roi -.2 -.3 -.4
136 capital -.9 -.8 -.7
137 wind -1.0
138 sun -1.0
139 trees -1.0;
140
141
142 * Adjust the cost coefficients for initially inactive technologies
143 * according to user assumptions:
144 set xk /roi, capital/;
145
146 ntelec(xk,"wind") = ntelec(xk,"wind") * (100+%c_wind%)/110;
147 ntelec(xk,"solar") = ntelec(xk,"solar") * (100+%c_solar%)/110;
148 ntelec(xk,"biomass") = ntelec(xk,"biomass") * (100+%c_biomass%)/110;
149
150
151 * Specify limits (resource or policy constraints) to the availability
152 * of technologies
153
154 parameter limit Electricty supply limits on extant technologies /
155 nuclear 12
156 hydro 8 /;
157
158 parameter nrsupply(n) Natural resource supplies (fraction of base output)/
159 wind %p_wind%
160 sun %p_sun%
161 trees %p_trees% /;
162
163 nrsupply(n) = nrsupply(n)/100 * sam("ele","ele");
164
165 parameter c0 Baseyear final consumption;
166 c0 = (-sam("roi","ra")-sam("ele","ra")-sam("oil","ra"));
167
168
25
169 set quota(t) Flag for technologies contributing to green quota;
170 quota(t) = no;
171
172 scalar share Target share for green quota /0/;
173
174 * By default we might set target share for green quota at base year level
175 share = sum(t$res(t), xtelec("ele",t))/sum(t, xtelec("ele",t));
176 display share;
177
178 scalar
179 dd Flag for double dividend policy analysis /0/,
180 ls Flag for lump-sum revenue-recyling /0/,
181 vat Flag for VAT revenue recycling /0/,
182 g0 Base year public consumption /0/,
183 tc0 Base year consumption tax /0/;
184
185
186 positive variables
187 * Activitiy levels
188 roi Aggregate output
189 ele(t) Production levels for electricity by technology
190 s(ff) Fossil fuel supplies
191 c Aggregate consumption (utility) formation
192 g Public good provision
193
194 * Price levels
195 proi Price of aggregate output
196 pele Price of electricty
197 pf(ff) Price of oil and gas
198 pl Wage rate
199 pk Price of malleable capital for X (and NT elec)
200 pr(ff) Rent on fossil fuel resources
201 pn(n) Rent on natural resources
202 pc Consumption (utility) price index
203 pg Price of public consumption
204 plim(t) Shadow price on electricity expansion
205 pkx(t) Price of capital to extant technologies
206 pcarb Carbon tax rate
207
208 * Income variables
209 ra Representative household
210 govt Government
211
26
212 * Endogenous taxes or subsidies
213 tau Uniform subsidy rate on renewable energy;
214
215 positive variables
216 phi_ls Lump-sum recycling
217 phi_tc Consumption tax recycling;
218
219
220 equations
221
222 * Zero profit conditions for activities linked to activity levels
223 zprf_roi Zero profit condition for macro production sector
224 zprf_ele(t) Zero profit condition for alternative electricity supply technologies
225 zprf_s(ff) Zero profit condition for fossil fuel supplies
226 zprf_c Zero profit condition for aggregate utility formation
227 zprf_g Zero profit condition for public good formation
228
229 * Market clearance conditions for goods linked to prices
230 mkt_proi Market clearance condition for macro production good
231 mkt_pele Market clearance condition for electricity
232 mkt_pf(ff) Market clearance condition for fossil fuels coal and gas
233 mkt_pl Market clearance condition for labor
234 mkt_pk Market clearance condition for malleable capital
235 mkt_pr(ff) Market clearance conditions for fossil fuel resources
236 mkt_pn(n) Market clearance conditions for natural resources
237 mkt_pcarb Market clearance condition for carbon
238 mkt_pkx(t) Market clearance condition for capital inputs to extant power production
239 mkt_plim(t) Market clearance condition for capacity on electricity expansion
240 mkt_pc Market clearance for aggregate utility good
241 mkt_g Market clearance for public good
242
243 * Income balance for representative household linked to income level
244 inc_ra Budget constraint for representative household
245 inc_govt Budget constraint for government
246
247 * Additional constraints
248 sub_res Endogenous subsidy to achieve renewable energy quota
249 eqy_ls Equal yield constraint for lump-sum recycling
250 eqy_tc Equal yield constraint for consumption tax recycling
251
252 parameter
253 theta_l_roi Cost share of labor in ROI production
254 theta_ele_roi Cost share of electricity in capital-electricity composite of ROI
27
255 theta_r_ff(ff) Cost share of fossil fuel resource in fossil fuel production
256 theta_l_ff(ff) Cost share of labor in non-resource input of fossil fuel production
257 theta_roi_ff(ff) Cost share of ROI in ROI-labor composite of fossil fuel production
258 theta_ele_c Cost share of electricity in oil-electricity composite of final consmption
259 theta_roi_c Cost share of ROI in final consumption
260 theta_roi_t(t) Cost share of ROI in electricity production by technology t
261 theta_k_t(t) Cost share of capital in electricity production by technology t
262 theta_ff_t(ff,t) Cost share of fossil fuel in electricity production by technology t;
263
264 theta_roi_c = -sam("roi","ra")/c0;
265 theta_l_roi = (-sam("labor","roi"))/sam("roi","roi");
266 theta_ele_roi = (-sam("ele","roi"))/ ((-sam("capital","roi")) + (-sam("ele","roi")));
267 theta_r_ff(ff) = (-sam("rent",ff))/ ((-sam("rent",ff)) + (-sam("roi",ff)) + (-sam("labor",ff)));
268 theta_roi_ff(ff)= (-sam("roi",ff)) / ((-sam("roi",ff)) + (-sam("labor",ff)));
269 theta_ele_c = (-sam("ele","ra"))/((-sam("ele","ra")) + (-sam("oil","ra")));
270 theta_roi_t(t)$xt(t) = (-xtelec("roi",t)/xtelec("ele",t));
271 theta_k_t(t)$xt(t) = (-xtelec("capital",t)/xtelec("ele",t));
272 theta_ff_t(ff,t)$xt(t) = (-xtelec(ff,t)/xtelec("ele",t));
273 theta_roi_t(t)$nt(t) = (-ntelec("roi",t)/ntelec("ele",t));
274 theta_k_t(t)$nt(t) = (-ntelec("capital",t)/ntelec("ele",t));
275 theta_l_ff(ff) = (-sam("labor",ff))/((-sam("labor",ff))+(-sam("roi",ff)));
276
277 * Definition of zero profit conditions
278 zprf_roi..
279 (theta_l_roi*pl**(1-esub_l_ke) + (1- theta_l_roi)
280 *(theta_ele_roi*pele**(1-esub_k_e) + (1-theta_ele_roi)*pk**(1-esub_k_e))
281 **((1-esub_l_ke)/(1-esub_k_e)))**(1/(1-esub_l_ke))
282 =G= proi;
283
284 zprf_ele(t)..
285 {theta_roi_t(t)*proi+ sum(ff,theta_ff_t(ff,t)*pf(ff))
286 + (theta_k_t(t)*pkx(t))$shortrun
287 + (theta_k_t(t)*pk)$(not shortrun)
288 + plim(t)$limit(t)
289 }$xt(t)
290 +
291 {theta_roi_t(t)*proi + theta_k_t(t)*pk + sum(n, (-ntelec(n,t))*pn(n))}$nt(t)
292 =G= pele*(1+tau$quota(t));
293
294 zprf_s(ff)..
295 (theta_r_ff(ff)*pr(ff)**(1-esub_ff(ff)) + (1-theta_r_ff(ff))*( theta_l_ff(ff)*pl
296 + (1-theta_l_ff(ff))*proi)**(1-esub_ff(ff)))**(1/(1-esub_ff(ff)))
297 + ((carbon(ff)*pcarb))$carblim
28
298 =G= pf(ff);
299
300 zprf_c..
301 (theta_roi_c*((proi*(1+tc0*phi_tc$dd))/(1+tc0$dd))**(1-esub_c)
302 + (1-theta_roi_c)*(theta_ele_c*pele**(1-esub_ele)
303 +(1-theta_ele_c)*pf("oil")**(1-esub_ele))**((1-esub_c)/(1-esub_ele)))**(1/(1-esub_c))
304 =G= pc;
305
306 zprf_g$dd..
307 proi =G= pg;
308
309 * Definition of market clearance conditions
310 mkt_proi..
311 roi*sam("roi","roi") =G=
312 sum(xt, ele(xt)*(-xtelec("roi",xt)/xtelec("ele",xt)))
313 + sum(nt, ele(nt)*(-ntelec("roi",nt)))
314 + sum(ff, (-sam("roi",ff))*s(ff)* ((theta_r_ff(ff)*pr(ff)**(1-esub_ff(ff))
315 + (1-theta_r_ff(ff))*( theta_l_ff(ff)*pl
316 + (1-theta_l_ff(ff))*proi)**(1-esub_ff(ff)))**(1/(1-esub_ff(ff)))
317 /( theta_l_ff(ff)*pl + (1-theta_l_ff(ff))*proi))**esub_ff(ff))
318 + (-sam("roi","ra")/(1+tc0$dd))*c*( (pc/(proi*(1+(tc0*phi_tc)$dd)))*(1+tc0$dd))**esub_c
319 + (g0*g)$dd;
320
321 mkt_pele..
322 sum(t, ele(t)) =G=
323 (-sam("ele","ra"))*c*(pc/(theta_ele_c*pele**(1-esub_ele)
324 +(1-theta_ele_c)*pf("oil")**(1-esub_ele))**(1/(1-esub_ele)))**esub_c
325 * (((theta_ele_c*pele**(1-esub_ele)
326 +(1-theta_ele_c)*pf("oil")**(1-esub_ele))**(1/(1-esub_ele)))/pele)**esub_ele
327 + (-sam("ele","roi"))*roi*(proi/((theta_ele_roi*pele**(1-esub_k_e)
328 + (1-theta_ele_roi)*pk**(1-esub_k_e))**(1/(1-esub_k_e))))**esub_l_ke
329 *((theta_ele_roi*pele**(1-esub_k_e)
330 + (1-theta_ele_roi)*pk**(1-esub_k_e))**(1/(1-esub_k_e))/pele)**esub_k_e;
331
332 mkt_pf(ff)..
333 sam(ff,ff)*s(ff) =G=
334 sum(xt, (-xtelec(ff,xt)/xtelec("ele",xt))*ele(xt))
335 + (-sam(ff,"ra"))*c*(pc/(theta_ele_c*pele**(1-esub_ele)
336 +(1-theta_ele_c)*pf("oil")**(1-esub_ele))**(1/(1-esub_ele)))**esub_c
337 * (((theta_ele_c*pele**(1-esub_ele)
338 +(1-theta_ele_c)*pf("oil")**(1-esub_ele))**(1/(1-esub_ele)))/pf("oil"))**esub_ele;
339
340 mkt_pl..
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341 sam("labor","ra") =G=
342 (-sam("labor","roi"))*roi*(proi/pl)**esub_l_ke
343 + sum(ff, (-sam("labor",ff))*s(ff)* ((theta_r_ff(ff)*pr(ff)**(1-esub_ff(ff))
344 + (1-theta_r_ff(ff))*( theta_l_ff(ff)*pl
345 + (1-theta_l_ff(ff))*proi)**(1-esub_ff(ff)))**(1/(1-esub_ff(ff)))
346 /( theta_l_ff(ff)*pl + (1-theta_l_ff(ff))*proi))**esub_ff(ff));
347
348 mkt_pk..
349 (-sam("capital","roi")+sum(xt,(-xtelec("capital",xt)))$(not shortrun)) =G=
350 (-sam("capital","roi"))*roi*(proi/((theta_ele_roi*pele**(1-esub_k_e)
351 + (1-theta_ele_roi)*pk**(1-esub_k_e))**(1/(1-esub_k_e))))**esub_l_ke
352 *((theta_ele_roi*pele**(1-esub_k_e)
353 + (1-theta_ele_roi)*pk**(1-esub_k_e))**(1/(1-esub_k_e))/pk)**esub_k_e
354 + sum(xt$(not shortrun),(-xtelec("capital",xt)/xtelec("ele",xt))*ele(xt))
355 + sum(nt,(-ntelec("capital",nt))*ele(nt));
356
357 mkt_pr(ff)..
358 (-sam("rent",ff)) =G=
359 (-sam("rent",ff))*s(ff)* ((theta_r_ff(ff)*pr(ff)**(1-esub_ff(ff))
360 + (1-theta_r_ff(ff))*( theta_l_ff(ff)*pl
361 + (1-theta_l_ff(ff))*proi)**(1-esub_ff(ff)))**(1/(1-esub_ff(ff)))/pr(ff))** esub_ff(ff);
362
363 mkt_pn(n)..
364 nrsupply(n) =G= sum(nt,(-ntelec(n,nt))*ele(nt));
365
366 mkt_pkx(xt)$shortrun..
367 (-xtelec("capital",xt)) =G= (-xtelec("capital",xt)/xtelec("ele",xt))*ele(xt);
368
369 mkt_plim(xt)$limit(xt)..
370 limit(xt) =G= ele(xt);
371
372 mkt_pcarb$carblim..
373 carblim =G= sum(ff,(carbon(ff)*sam(ff,ff))*s(ff));
374
375 mkt_pc ..
376 c0*c =G= ra/pc ;
377
378 mkt_g$dd ..
379 g0*g =G= govt/pg ;
380
381 * Income definition for representative household
382 inc_ra..
383 (-sam("capital","roi")+sum(xt,(-xtelec("capital",xt)))$(not shortrun))*pk
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384 + sum(xt$shortrun, (-xtelec("capital",xt))*pkx(xt))
385 + sam("labor","ra")*pl
386 + sum(ff,(-sam("rent",ff))*pr(ff))
387 + sum(n, nrsupply(n)*pn(n))
388 + (carblim*pcarb)$carblim$(not dd)
389 + sum(xt$limit(xt), limit(xt)*plim(xt))
390 - sum(t$quota(t), pele*ele(t)*tau)
391 - (pc*phi_ls)$dd
392 =G= ra;
393
394 * Income definition for government
395 inc_govt$dd..
396 (carblim*pcarb)$carblim + pc*phi_ls
397 + ((-sam("roi","ra")/(1+tc0$dd))*c
398 *( (pc/(proi*(1+(tc0*phi_tc)$dd)))*(1+tc0$dd))**esub_c)*proi*tc0*phi_tc
399 =G= govt;
400
401 * Endogenous subsidy to assure renewables quota
402 sub_res$card(quota)..
403 sum(t$res(t), ele(t)) =G= share*sum(t, ele(t));
404
405 * Endogenous equal yield constraints
406 eqy_ls$dd..
407 g =G= 1;
408
409 eqy_tc$dd..
410 g =G= 1;
411
412
413 * Define MCP model
414 model mcp_hybrid / zprf_roi.roi, zprf_ele.ele, zprf_s.s, zprf_c.c, zprf_g.g,
415 mkt_proi.proi, mkt_pele.pele, mkt_pf.pf, mkt_pl.pl,
416 mkt_pk.pk, mkt_pr.pr, mkt_pn.pn, mkt_pcarb.pcarb,
417 mkt_pkx.pkx, mkt_plim.plim, mkt_pc.pc, mkt_g.pg, inc_ra.ra,
418 sub_res.tau, inc_govt.govt, eqy_ls.phi_ls, eqy_tc.phi_tc
419 /;
420
421 * Benchmark initialization
422
423 * In the base year new-vintage technologies are inactive
424 * and the prices of backstop natural resources are zero
425 * Extant technologies with capacity limits are assumed to
426 * operate at the upper bound with a zero shadow value in the
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427 * base year
428
429 ele.l(nt) = 0;
430 pn.l(n) = 0;
431 plim.l(xt) = 0;
432
433 ele.l(xt) = xtelec("ele",xt);
434
435 * Initialize activities and prices
436 roi.l = 1; ele.l(xt)= xtelec("ele",xt); s.l(ff) = 1; c.l = 1;
437 proi.l = 1; pele.l = 1; pf.l(ff) = 1; pl.l = 1; pk.l = 1; pr.l(ff) = 1;
438 pkx.l(t)$((-xtelec("capital",t))$shortrun) = 1; plim.l(t) = 0;
439 pn.l(n) = 1; pc.l = 1;
440
441 * Install lower bounds on prices to avoid divison by zero in MCP formulation
442 proi.lo = 1e-5; pele.lo = 1e-5; pf.lo(ff) = 1e-5; pl.lo = 1e-5; pk.lo = 1e-5;
443 pr.lo(ff) = 1e-5; pkx.lo(t)$((-xtelec("capital",t))$shortrun) = 1e-5; pc.lo = 1e-5;
444
445 * Tie down "active" model specification
446 phi_tc.fx = 1; phi_ls.fx = 0;
447 g.fx = 0; pg.fx = 0; govt.fx = 0; pcarb.fx = 0;
448 pkx.fx(t)$(not (-xtelec("capital",t))$shortrun) = 0;
449 tau.fx$(not card(quota)) = 0;
450 plim.fx(t)$(not limit(t)) = 0;
451
452 * In the base year we have no new-vintage electricity and the prices of backstop
453 * natural resources are zero:
454
455 ele.l(nt) = 0;
456 pn.l(n) = 0;
457 pcarb.l = 0;
458 pkx.l(t)$((-xtelec("capital",t))$shortrun) =1;
459
460 ra.l = (-sam("capital","roi")+sum(xt,(-xtelec("capital",xt)))$(not shortrun))*pk.l
461 + sum(xt$shortrun, (-xtelec("capital",xt))*pkx.l(xt))
462 + sam("labor","ra")*pl.l
463 + sum(ff,(-sam("rent",ff))*pr.l(ff))
464 + sum(n, nrsupply(n)*pn.l(n))
465 + (carblim*pcarb.l)$carblim
466 + sum(xt$limit(xt), limit(xt)*plim.l(xt))
467 - sum(t$quota(t), pele.l*ele.l(t)*tau.l)
468 - (pc.l*phi_ls.l)$dd;
469
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470 govt.l$dd = (carblim*pcarb.l)$carblim + pc.l*phi_ls.l
471 + (-sam("roi","ra")/(1+tc0$dd))*c.l*(pc.l/(proi.l*(1+tc0*phi_tc.l)$dd)
472 /(1+tc0$dd))**esub_c*pc.l*tc0*phi_tc.l;
473
474 * Check the benchmark:
475 * - marginal of all active activities must be zero
476 * - marginal of all positivie prices must be zero
477 * - marginal of all positive incomens must be zero
478
479 mcp_hybrid.iterlim = 0;
480 solve mcp_hybrid using mcp;
481
482 * Relax iteration limit for counterfactual policy analysis
483 mcp_hybrid.iterlim = 4000;
484
485 *===========================================================================
486 * Analysis of policy scenarios (as laid out in the paper)
487 *
488 * (i) gradual nuclear phase-out
489 * (ii) target quota for renewables (green quota)
490 * (iii) carbon taxation (environmental tax reform)
491
492
493 * Define report parameters
494 parameter
495 ev(*) Equivalent variation in income
496 supply(*,*) Electricity supply by technology
497 carbtax(*) Carbon permit price
498 subsidy Subsidy rate on electricity from renewables
499 report Report default parameter;
500
501 scalar epsilon /1.e-5/;
502
503 *===========================================================================
504 * Scenario 1: Gradual nuclear phase-out
505
506 set nsc Nuclear phase scenarios / 0, 25, 50, 75, 100/;
507
508 parameter limit_0 Base year capacity limits;
509 limit_0("nuclear") = limit("nuclear");
510
511 loop(nsc,
512
33
513 * Assign available capacity for nuclear power
514 limit("nuclear") = (1 - (ord(nsc)-1)/(card(nsc)-1))*limit_0("nuclear");
515 Display limit;
516 * If nuclear capacity is set to zero, assure complete nuclear phase out
517 if ((not limit("nuclear")),
518 ele.fx("nuclear") = 0;
519 );
520 solve mcp_hybrid using mcp;
521 supply(nsc,t) = ele.l(t) + epsilon;
522 ev(nsc) = 100 * (c.l-1) + epsilon ;
523
524 );
525
526
527 $setglobal labels nsc
528 $setglobal gp_opt0 "set data style linespoints"
529
530 $setglobal gp_opt1 "set key below"
531 report(nsc,"ev") = ev(nsc);
532 $setglobal gp_opt2 "set title ’Welfare changes’"
533 $setglobal gp_opt3 "set xlabel ’Nuclear capacity reduction (% vis--vis BaU)’"
534 $setglobal gp_opt4 "set ylabel ’Equivalent variation in income (%)’"
535 $libinclude plot report
536 display report;
537 report(nsc,"ev") = 0;
538
539 $setglobal gp_opt2 "set title ’Electricity supply by technology’"
540 $setglobal gp_opt3 "set xlabel ’Nuclear capacity reduction (% vis--vis BaU)’"
541 $setglobal gp_opt4 "set ylabel ’Activity level of technologies’"
542 $libinclude plot supply
543
544 * Re-initialize parameterization for subsequent scenarios
545 limit("nuclear") = limit_0("nuclear");
546 ele.lo("nuclear") = 0; ele.up("nuclear") = +inf; ele.l("nuclear")=xtelec("ele","nuclear");
547
548
549 *===========================================================================
550 * Scenario 2: Green quotas
551
552 set qsc Green quota scenarios / 0 13, 5 18, 10 23, 15 28, 20 33/;
553 * Note: We start from the base year situation without binding target
554 * share and then increase the share iteratively by 5%.
555 * The descriptive text for scenario set elements captures
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556 * the actual target level of green electricity as percent
557 * in overall electricity production (base year quota is 13%).
558 * The plot-command picks up the descriptive text as
559 * scenario labels when produce a graphical exposition of results.
560
561 * Assign initial level values for variables
562 roi.l = 1; ele.l(xt)= xtelec("ele",xt); s.l(ff) = 1; c.l = 1;
563 proi.l = 1; pele.l = 1; pf.l(ff) = 1; pl.l = 1; pk.l = 1; pr.l(ff) = 1;
564 pkx.l(t)$((-xtelec("capital",t))$shortrun) = 1; plim.l(t) = 0;
565 pn.l(n) = 1; pc.l = 1;
566 * Install lower bounds on prices to avoid divison by zero in MCP formulation
567 proi.lo = 1e-5; pele.lo = 1e-5; pf.lo(ff) = 1e-5; pl.lo = 1e-5; pk.lo = 1e-5; pr.lo(ff) = 1e-5;
568 pkx.lo(t)$((-xtelec("capital",t))$shortrun) = 1e-5; pc.lo = 1e-5;
569 ra.l = c0;
570
571 parameter share_0 Base year renewable share;
572 share_0 = share;
573
574 quota(res) = yes;
575 tau.lo = 0; tau.l = 0; tau.up = 0.99;
576
577 loop(qsc,
578 * Assign target shares for renewables in electricity production
579 share = min(1, (share_0 + 20/100* (ord(qsc)-1)/(card(qsc)-1)));
580
581 solve mcp_hybrid using mcp;
582
583 supply(qsc,t) = ele.l(t) + epsilon;
584 ev(qsc) = 100 * (c.l-1) + epsilon;
585 subsidy(qsc) = 100*tau.l + epsilon;
586 );
587
588 $setglobal labels qsc
589
590 report(qsc,"ev") = ev(qsc);
591 $setglobal gp_opt2 "set title ’Welfare changes’"
592 $setglobal gp_opt3 "set xlabel ’Green quota in % of overall electricity supply’"
593 $setglobal gp_opt4 "set ylabel ’Equivalent variation in income (%)’"
594 $libinclude plot report
595 display report;
596 report(qsc,"ev") = 0;
597
598 $setglobal gp_opt2 "set title ’Electricity supply by technology’"
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599 $setglobal gp_opt3 "set xlabel ’Green quota in % of overall electricity supply’"
600 $setglobal gp_opt4 "set ylabel ’Activity level of technologies’"
601 $libinclude plot supply
602
603 report(qsc,"subsidy") = subsidy(qsc);
604 $setglobal gp_opt2 "set title ’Subsidy on renewables’"
605 $setglobal gp_opt3 "set xlabel ’Green quota in % of overall electricity supply’"
606 $setglobal gp_opt4 "set ylabel ’Subsidy rate (% of electricity price)’"
607 $libinclude plot report
608 display report;
609 report(qsc,"subsidy") = 0;
610
611 * Re-initialize parameterization for subsequent scenarios
612 share = share_0;
613 quota(res) = no;
614 tau.fx = 0;
615 *===========================================================================
616 * Scenario 3: Carbon taxation (double dividend)
617
618 * First re-specify base year (benchmark) to public good extension
619 mcp_hybrid.iterlim = 0;
620
621 dd = 1;
622 g.lo = 0; g.up = + inf; govt.lo = 0; govt.up = + inf;
623 g0 = 0.2 *(-sam("roi","ra"));
624 tc0 = g0/((-sam("roi","ra")) - g0);
625 display g0, tc0;
626
627 * Relax ficed variables
628 g.lo = 0; g.up = +inf; pg.lo = 0; pg.up = +inf; govt.lo = 0; govt.up = + inf;
629 pcarb.lo = 0; pcarb.up = + inf;
630
631 * Initially, we assume that lump-sum transfers are active
632 * as the equal-yield instrument
633 phi_ls.l = 0; phi_ls.lo = -inf; phi_ls.up = +inf;
634 phi_tc.fx = 1;
635
636 * Assign base year carbon emissions (at shadow price of zero)
637 carblim = sum(ff, sam(ff,ff)*carbon(ff));
638 pcarb.l = 0;
639
640 * Benchmark replication check for the model with public good extension
641 * Initialize activities and prices
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642 roi.l = 1; ele.l(xt)= xtelec("ele",xt); ele.l(nt) = 0; s.l(ff) = 1; c.l = 1;
643 proi.l = 1; pele.l = 1; pf.l(ff) = 1; pl.l = 1; pk.l = 1; pr.l(ff) = 1; pg.l = 1;
644 pkx.l(t)$((-xtelec("capital",t))$shortrun) = 1; plim.l(t)$limit(t) = 0;
645 pc.l = 1; pn.l(n) = 0; ra.l = c0; govt.l = g0;
646
647 * Install lower bounds on prices to avoid divison by zero in MCP formulation
648 proi.lo = 1e-5; pele.lo = 1e-5; pf.lo(ff) = 1e-5; pl.lo = 1e-5; pk.lo = 1e-5; pr.lo(ff) = 1e-5;
649 pkx.lo(t)$((-xtelec("capital",t))$shortrun) = 1e-5; pc.lo = 1e-5; pg.lo = 1e-5;
650
651 * Check the re-specified benchmark:
652 * - marginal of all active activities must be zero
653 * - marginal of all positivie prices must be zero
654 * - marginal of all positive incomens must be zero
655
656 mcp_hybrid.iterlim = 0;
657
658 solve mcp_hybrid using mcp;
659
660 * Relax iteration limit
661 mcp_hybrid.iterlim = 4000;
662
663
664 * Specification of carbon tax scenarios based on exogenous emission reduction targets
665 set csc Carbon abatement scenarios scenarios / 0, 5, 10, 15, 20/;
666
667 parameter carbon_0 Benchmark capacity limits;
668 parameter ev_ Report parameter for welfare changes;
669
670 carbon_0 = carblim;
671
672 display carbon_0;
673
674 loop(csc,
675 * Assign carbon emission limit
676 carblim = (1 - 0.2*(ord(csc)-1)/(card(csc)-1))*carbon_0;
677
678 * Activate lump-sum transfer as recycling instrument
679 phi_ls.l = 0; phi_ls.lo = -inf; phi_ls.up = +inf;
680 phi_tc.fx = 1;
681
682 solve mcp_hybrid using mcp;
683
684 ev_(csc,"ls") = 100 * (c.l-1) + epsilon;
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685
686 * Activate consumption tax as recycling instrument
687 phi_tc.l = 1; phi_tc.lo = -0.99; phi_tc.up = +inf;
688 phi_ls.fx = 0;
689 solve mcp_hybrid using mcp;
690
691 ev_(csc,"tc") = 100 * (c.l-1) + epsilon;
692 );
693
694 $setglobal labels csc
695 $setglobal gp_opt2 "set title ’Welfare changes’"
696 $setglobal gp_opt3 "set xlabel ’Carbon emission reduction (in % vis--vis base year)’"
697 $setglobal gp_opt4 "set ylabel ’Equivalent variation in income (%)’"
698 $libinclude plot ev_
699 display ev_;
700 ev_(csc,"tc") = 0; ev_(csc,"ls") = 0;
701
702 * Re-initialize parameterization for subsequent policy scenarios
703 dd = 0; g0 = 0; tc0 = 0;
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5.2 MPSGE Formulation
1 $Title Static maquette of integrated TD/BU hybrid model
2
3 * Model formulation in meta-language MPSGE
4 * (see Rutherford 1995 for documentation)
5
6 *===========================================================================
7 * Model code for stylzed integrated bottom-up/top-down analysis of energy
8 * policies based on:
9 *
10 * ZEW Discussion Paper 05-28
11 * Integrating Bottom-Up into Top-Down:
12 * A Mixed Complementarity Approach
13 *
14 * Contact the authors at: boehringer@zew.de; rutherford@colorado.edu
15 *============================================================================
16
17 * For plotting the results you must have installed the gnuplot-shareware
18 * (see http://debreu.colorado.edu/gnuplot/gnuplot.htm for downloads)
19
20 *============================================================================
21 * List of parameters subject to sensitivity analysis
22 * The user can change the default settings.
23
24 * Choice of key elasticities:
25 * Elasticity of substitution in final consumption
26 $if not setglobal esub_c $setglobal esub_c 0.5
27
28 * Elasticity in gas supply
29 $if not setglobal esub_gas $setglobal esub_gas 1.5
30
31 * Elasticity in coal supply
32 $if not setglobal esub_coal $setglobal esub_coal 3
33
34 * Elasticity in oil supply
35 $if not setglobal esub_oil $setglobal esub_oil 1.5
36
37
38 * Choice of resource availability for renewables:
39 * (as a fraction of base-year total electricity production)
40 * Potential wind supply - (%)
41 $if not setglobal p_wind $setglobal p_wind 10
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42
43 * Potential solar supply - (%)
44 $if not setglobal p_sun $setglobal p_sun 10
45
46 * Potential biomass supply - (%)
47 $if not setglobal p_trees $setglobal p_trees 10
48
49
50 * Cost disadvantage of inital slack technologies:
51 * Wind energy premium (%)
52 $if not setglobal c_wind $setglobal c_wind 10
53
54 * Solar energy premium (%)
55 $if not setglobal c_solar $setglobal c_solar 10
56
57 * Biomass energy premium (%)
58 $if not setglobal c_biomass $setglobal c_biomass 10
59
60
61 * Other central model assumptions:
62 * Time horizon (short, long)
63 * N.B.: For short-run analysis capital is immobile across sectors
64 $if not setglobal horizon $setglobal horizon long
65
66 *============================================================================
67
68
69 * Assign user-specific changes of default assumptions
70 scalar shortrun Flag for short-run capital mobility/1/;
71
72 $if "%horizon%"=="long" shortrun=0;
73
74 * Elasticitities of substitution (ESUB)
75 scalar esub_c Elasticity of substituion in final demand /%esub_c%/
76 esub_ele ESUB between electricity and oil in final demand /0.5/
77 esub_k_e ESUB between capital and energy in ROI production /0.5/
78 esub_l_ke ESUB between labor and other inputs in ROI production /0.8/;
79
80 set t Electricity Technologies (current and future)
81 /coal,gas,nuclear,hydro,wind,solar,biomass/;
82
83 set xt(t) Existing technologies /coal,gas,nuclear,hydro/;
84
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85 set nt(t) New vintage technologies /wind,solar,biomass/;
86
87 set ff Fossil fuel inputs /coa, gas, oil/;
88
89 set n Natural resources /wind, sun, trees/;
90
91
92 set res(t) Renewable energy sources /hydro, wind, solar, biomass/;
93
94 * The following data table describes an economic equilibrium in
95 * the base year:
96
97
98 table sam Base year social accounting matrix
99
100 roi coa gas oil ele ra
101 roi 200 -5 -5 -10 -10 -170
102 coa 15 -15
103 gas 15 -15
104 oil 30 -30
105 ele -10 60 -50
106 capital -80 -20 100
107 labor -110 -5 -5 -10 130
108 rent -5 -5 -10 20 ;
109
110 parameter carbon(ff) Carbon coefficients /oil 1, gas 1, coa 2/;
111
112 scalar carblim Carbon target /0/;
113
114 parameter esub_ff(ff) Elastictity of substitution in fossil fuel production
115 /gas %esub_gas%, coa %esub_coal%, oil %esub_oil%/;
116
117 * The following data tables describes electricy generation in
118 * the base year as well as the technology coefficients for technologies
119 * which are inactive in the base year (wind, solar, biomass). Inactive
120 * technologies are by defaults %c_****% more costly.
121
122 table xtelec Electricty technologies - extant (initially active)
123
124 coal gas nuclear hydro
125 ele 20 20 12 8
126 roi -1 -1 -8
127 gas -15
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128 coa -15
129 capital -4 -4 -4 -8;
130
131
132 table ntelec Electricty technologies - new vintage (initially inactive)
133
134 wind solar biomass
135 ele 1.0 1.0 1.0
136 roi -.2 -.3 -.4
137 capital -.9 -.8 -.7
138 wind -1.0
139 sun -1.0
140 trees -1.0;
141
142
143 * Adjust the cost coefficients for initially inactive technologies
144 * according to user assumptions:
145 set xk /roi, capital/;
146
147 ntelec(xk,"wind") = ntelec(xk,"wind") * (100+%c_wind%)/110;
148 ntelec(xk,"solar") = ntelec(xk,"solar") * (100+%c_solar%)/110;
149 ntelec(xk,"biomass") = ntelec(xk,"biomass") * (100+%c_biomass%)/110;
150
151
152 * Specify limits (resource or policy constraints) to the availability
153 * of technologies
154
155 parameter limit Electricty supply limits on extant technologies /
156 nuclear 12
157 hydro 8 /;
158
159 parameter nrsupply(n) Natural resource supplies (fraction of base output)/
160 wind %p_wind%
161 sun %p_sun%
162 trees %p_trees% /;
163
164 nrsupply(n) = nrsupply(n)/100 * sam("ele","ele");
165
166 parameter c0 Baseyear final consumption;
167 c0 = (-sam("roi","ra")-sam("ele","ra")-sam("oil","ra"));
168
169
170 set quota(t) Flag for technologies contributing to green quota;
42
171 quota(t) = no;
172
173 scalar share Target share for green quota /0/;
174
175 * By default we might set target share for green quota at base year level
176 share = sum(t$res(t), xtelec("ele",t))/sum(t, xtelec("ele",t));
177 display share;
178
179 scalar
180 dd Flag for double dividend policy analysis /0/,
181 ls Flag for lump-sum revenue-recyling /0/,
182 vat Flag for VAT revenue recycling /0/,
183 g0 Base year public consumption /0/,
184 tc0 Base year consumption tax /0/;
185
186 * MPSGE formulation of the hybrid model
187 $ontext
188
189 $model:mps_hybrid
190
191 $sectors:
192 roi ! Aggregate output
193 ele(t) ! Production levels for electricity by technology
194 s(ff) ! Fossil fuel supplies
195 c ! Aggregate consumption (utility) formation
196 g$dd ! Public good provision
197
198 $commodities:
199 proi ! Price of aggregate output
200 pele ! Price of electricty
201 pf(ff) ! Price of oil and gas
202 pl ! Wage rate
203 pk ! Price of malleable capital for X (and NT elec)
204 pr(ff) ! Rent on fossil fuel resources
205 pn(n) ! Rent on natural resources
206 pc ! Consumption (utility) price index
207 pg$dd ! Price of public consumption
208 plim(t)$limit(t) ! Shadow price on electricity expansion
209 pkx(t)$((-xtelec("capital",t))$shortrun) ! Price of capital to extant technologies
210 pcarb$carblim ! Carbon tax rate
211
212 $consumers:
213 ra ! Representative household
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214 govt$dd ! Government
215
216 $auxiliary:
217 tau$card(quota) ! Uniform subsidy rate on renewable energy
218 phi_ls$dd ! Lump-sum recycling
219 phi_tc$dd ! Consumption tax recycling
220
221
222 * Aggregate output:
223
224 $prod:roi s:esub_l_ke ke:esub_k_e
225 o:proi q:sam("roi","roi")
226 i:pl q:(-sam("labor","roi"))
227 i:pk q:(-sam("capital","roi")) ke:
228 i:pele q:(-sam("ele","roi")) ke:
229
230 * Extant electricity:
231
232 $prod:ele(xt)
233 o:pele q:1 raa:ra n:tau$quota(xt) m:(-1)$quota(xt)
234 i:proi q:(-xtelec("roi",xt)/xtelec("ele",xt))
235 i:pf(ff) q:(-xtelec(ff,xt)/xtelec("ele",xt))
236 i:pkx(xt)$shortrun q:(-xtelec("capital",xt)/xtelec("ele",xt))
237 i:pk$(not shortrun) q:(-xtelec("capital",xt)/xtelec("ele",xt))
238 i:plim(xt)$limit(xt) q:1
239
240 * New vintage electricity:
241
242 $prod:ele(nt)
243 o:pele q:1 a:ra n:tau$quota(nt) m:(-1)$quota(nt)
244 i:proi q:(-ntelec("roi",nt))
245 i:pk q:(-ntelec("capital",nt))
246 i:pn(n) q:(-ntelec(n,nt))
247
248 $prod:s(ff) s:0 r:esub_ff(ff) xl(r):0
249 o:pf(ff) q:sam(ff,ff)
250 i:pcarb$carblim q:(carbon(ff)*sam(ff,ff))
251 i:proi q:(-sam("roi",ff)) xl:
252 i:pl q:(-sam("labor",ff)) xl:
253 i:pr(ff) q:(-sam("rent",ff)) r:
254
255 $prod:c s:esub_c e:esub_ele
256 o:pc q:c0
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257 i:proi q:(-sam("roi","ra")/(1+tc0$dd)) p:(1+tc0$dd)
258 + a:govt$dd n:phi_tc$dd m:tc0$dd
259 i:pele q:(-sam("ele","ra")) e:
260 i:pf("oil") q:(-sam("oil","ra")) e:
261
262 $demand:ra
263 d:pc q:c0
264 e:pk q:(-sam("capital","roi")+sum(xt,(-xtelec("capital",xt)))$(not shortrun))
265 e:pkx(xt)$shortrun q:(-xtelec("capital",xt))
266 e:pl q:(sam("labor","ra"))
267 e:pr(ff) q:(-sam("rent",ff))
268 e:pn(n) q:nrsupply(n)
269 e:pcarb$carblim$(not dd) q:carblim
270 e:plim(xt)$limit(xt) q:limit(xt)
271 e:pc$dd q:(-1) r:phi_ls$dd
272
273
274 $demand:govt$dd
275 d:pg q:g0
276 e:pc q:1 r:phi_ls
277 e:pcarb$carblim q:carblim
278
279 $prod:g$dd
280 O:pg q:g0
281 i:proi q:g0
282
283
284 $constraint:tau$card(quota)
285 sum(t$res(t), ele(t)) =e= share*sum(t, ele(t));
286
287
288 $constraint:phi_ls$dd
289 g =e= 1;
290
291 $constraint:phi_tc$dd
292 g=e= 1;
293
294 $offtext
295 $sysinclude mpsgeset mps_hybrid
296
297 * In the base year new-vintage technologies are inactive
298 * and the prices of backstop natural resources are zero
299 * Extant technologies with capacity limits are assumed to
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300 * operate at the upper bound with a zero shadow value in the
301 * base year
302
303 ele.l(nt) = 0;
304 pn.l(n) = 0;
305 plim.l(xt) = 0;
306
307 ele.l(xt) = xtelec("ele",xt);
308
309 * Benchmark replication check
310 mps_hybrid.iterlim = 0;
311 $include mps_hybrid.gen
312 solve mps_hybrid using mcp;
313
314 display "The precision of the benchmark dataset is:", mps_hybrid.objval;
315 abort$(ABS(mps_hybrid.objval) gt 1e-4)"MPSGE model does not calibrate";
316
317
318 * Relax iteration limit for counterfactual policy analysis
319 mps_hybrid.iterlim = 4000;
320
321
322 *===========================================================================
323 * Analysis of policy scenarios (as laid out in the paper)
324 *
325 * (i) gradual nuclear phase-out
326 * (ii) target quota for renewables (green quota)
327 * (iii) carbon taxation (environmental tax reform)
328
329
330 * Define report parameters
331 parameter
332 ev(*) Equivalent variation in income
333 supply(*,*) Electricity supply by technology
334 carbtax(*) Carbon permit price
335 subsidy Subsidy rate on electricity from renewables
336 report Report default parameter;
337
338 scalar epsilon /1.e-5/;
339
340
341 *===========================================================================
342 * Scenario 1: Gradual nuclear phase-out
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343
344 set nsc Nuclear phase scenarios / 0, 25, 50, 75, 100/;
345
346 parameter limit_0 Base year capacity limits;
347 limit_0("nuclear") = limit("nuclear");
348
349 loop(nsc,
350
351 * Assign available capacity for nuclear power
352 limit("nuclear") = (1 - (ord(nsc)-1)/(card(nsc)-1))*limit_0("nuclear");
353 * If nuclear capacity is set to zero, assure complete nuclear phase out
354 if ((not limit("nuclear")),
355 ele.fx("nuclear") = 0;
356 );
357 $include mps_hybrid.gen
358 solve mps_hybrid using mcp;
359 supply(nsc,t) = ele.l(t) + epsilon;
360 ev(nsc) = 100 * (c.l-1) + epsilon ;
361
362 );
363
364
365 $setglobal labels nsc
366 $setglobal gp_opt0 "set data style linespoints"
367
368 $setglobal gp_opt1 "set key below"
369 report(nsc,"ev") = ev(nsc);
370 $setglobal gp_opt2 "set title ’Welfare changes’"
371 $setglobal gp_opt3 "set xlabel ’Nuclear capacity reduction (% vis--vis BaU)’"
372 $setglobal gp_opt4 "set ylabel ’Equivalent variation in income (%)’"
373 $libinclude plot report
374 display report;
375 report(nsc,"ev") = 0;
376
377
378 $setglobal gp_opt2 "set title ’Electricity supply by technology’"
379 $setglobal gp_opt3 "set xlabel ’Nuclear capacity reduction (% vis--vis BaU)’"
380 $setglobal gp_opt4 "set ylabel ’Activity level of technologies’"
381 $libinclude plot supply
382
383 * Re-initialize parameterization for subsequent scenarios
384 limit("nuclear") = limit_0("nuclear");
385 ele.lo("nuclear") = 0; ele.up("nuclear") = +inf;
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386 ele.l("nuclear")=xtelec("ele","nuclear");
387
388
389 *===========================================================================
390 * Scenario 2: Green quotas
391
392 set qsc Green quota scenarios / 0 13, 5 18, 10 23, 15 28, 20 33/;
393 * Note: We start from the base year situation without binding target
394 * share and then increase the share iteratively by 5%.
395 * The descriptive text for scenario set elements captures
396 * the actual target level of green electricity as percent
397 * in overall electricity production (base year quota is 13%).
398 * The plot-command picks up the descriptive text as
399 * scenario labels when produce a graphical exposition of results.
400
401
402 parameter share_0 Base year renewable share;
403 share_0 = share;
404
405 quota(res) = yes;
406
407
408 loop(qsc,
409 * Assign target shares for renewables in electricity production
410 share = min(1, (share_0 + 20/100* (ord(qsc)-1)/(card(qsc)-1)));
411
412 $include mps_hybrid.gen
413 solve mps_hybrid using mcp;
414
415 supply(qsc,t) = ele.l(t) + epsilon;
416 ev(qsc) = 100 * (c.l-1) + epsilon;
417 subsidy(qsc) = 100*tau.l + epsilon;
418 );
419
420 $setglobal labels qsc
421
422 report(qsc,"ev") = ev(qsc);
423 $setglobal gp_opt2 "set title ’Welfare changes’"
424 $setglobal gp_opt3 "set xlabel ’Green quota in % of overall electricity supply’"
425 $setglobal gp_opt4 "set ylabel ’Equivalent variation in income (%)’"
426 $libinclude plot report
427 display report;
428 report(qsc,"ev") = 0;
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429
430 $setglobal gp_opt2 "set title ’Electricity supply by technology’"
431 $setglobal gp_opt3 "set xlabel ’Green quota in % of overall electricity supply’"
432 $setglobal gp_opt4 "set ylabel ’Activity level of technologies’"
433 $libinclude plot supply
434
435 report(qsc,"subsidy") = subsidy(qsc);
436 $setglobal gp_opt2 "set title ’Subsidy on renewables’"
437 $setglobal gp_opt3 "set xlabel ’Green quota in % of overall electricity supply’"
438 $setglobal gp_opt4 "set ylabel ’Subsidy rate (% of electricity price)’"
439 $libinclude plot report
440 display report;
441 report(qsc,"subsidy") = 0;
442
443 * Re-initialize parameterization for subsequent scenarios
444 share = share_0;
445 quota(res) = no;
446 $exit
447 *===========================================================================
448 * Scenario 3: Carbon taxation (double dividend)
449
450 * First re-calibrate base year (benchmark) to public good extension
451 mps_hybrid.iterlim = 0;
452
453 dd = 1;
454 g0 = 0.2 *(-sam("roi","ra"));
455 tc0 = g0/((-sam("roi","ra")) - g0);
456 display g0, tc0;
457
458 * Initially, we assume that lump-sum transfers are active
459 * as the equal-yield instrument
460 phi_ls.l = 0; phi_ls.lo = -inf; phi_ls.up = +inf;
461 phi_tc.fx = 1;
462
463 * Assign base year carbon emissions (at shadow price of zero)
464 carblim = sum(ff, sam(ff,ff)*carbon(ff));
465 pcarb.l = 0;
466
467 * Benchmark replication check for the model with public good extension
468 * Initialize activities and prices
469 roi.l = 1; ele.l(xt)= xtelec("ele",xt); ele.l(nt) = 0; s.l(ff) = 1; c.l = 1;
470 proi.l = 1; pele.l = 1; pf.l(ff) = 1; pl.l = 1; pk.l = 1; pr.l(ff) = 1;
471 pkx.l(t)$((-xtelec("capital",t))$shortrun) = 1; plim.l(t)$limit(t) = 0;
49
472 pc.l = 1; pn.l(n) = 0; ra.l = c0; govt.l = g0;
473
474 mps_hybrid.iterlim = 0;
475 $include mps_hybrid.gen
476 solve mps_hybrid using mcp;
477
478 display "The precision of the re-specified benchmark dataset is:", mps_hybrid.objval;
479 abort$(ABS(mps_hybrid.objval) gt 1e-4)"MPSGE model does not calibrate";
480
481 * Relax iteration limit
482 mps_hybrid.iterlim = 4000;
483
484
485 * Specification of carbon tax scenarios based on exogenous emission reduction targets
486 set csc Carbon abatement scenarios scenarios / 0, 5, 10, 15, 20/;
487
488 parameter carbon_0 Benchmark capacity limits;
489 parameter ev_ Report parameter for welfare changes;
490
491 carbon_0 = carblim;
492
493 display carbon_0;
494
495 loop(csc,
496 * Assign carbon emission limit
497 carblim = (1 - 0.2*(ord(csc)-1)/(card(csc)-1))*carbon_0;
498
499 * Activate lump-sum transfer as recycling instrument
500 phi_ls.l = 0; phi_ls.lo = -inf; phi_ls.up = +inf;
501 phi_tc.fx = 1;
502 $include mps_hybrid.gen
503 solve mps_hybrid using mcp;
504 ev_(csc,"ls") = 100 * (c.l-1) + epsilon;
505
506 * Activate consumption tax as recycling instrument
507 phi_tc.l = 1; phi_tc.lo = -0.99; phi_tc.up = +inf;
508 phi_ls.fx = 0;
509 $include mps_hybrid.gen
510 solve mps_hybrid using mcp;
511 ev_(csc,"tc") = 100 * (c.l-1) + epsilon;
512 );
513
514 $setglobal labels csc
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515 $setglobal gp_opt2 "set title ’Welfare changes’"
516 $setglobal gp_opt3 "set xlabel ’Carbon emission reduction (in % vis--vis base year)’"
517 $setglobal gp_opt4 "set ylabel ’Equivalent variation in income (%)’"
518 $libinclude plot ev_
519 display ev_;
520 ev_(csc,"tc") = 0; ev_(csc,"ls") = 0;
521
522 * Re-initialize parameterization for subsequent policy scenarios
523 dd = 0; g0 = 0; tc0 = 0;
51
